A five factor measure of safety culture

Peter Smith and Craig Garret, (Faculty of Science, Engineering & Health, Cental Queensland University) and Daryl Calvert (BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance)

1.0 Introduction

Safety culture is loosely described as the culture in which safety is understood (Cullen, 1990). It lies within the wider organisational culture and alludes to individual, job, and organisational features that affect and influence health & safety (Cooper, 2000). It came to prominence following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster but, whilst it emphasizes the importance of organizational attitudes, values and beliefs to safety outcomes, safety culture lacks a clear theoretical framework around which measures may be constructed.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a five factor measure that sets safety culture empirically within a psychometric paradigm that supports rigorous measurement.

2.0 **Development of the survey measure.**

2.1 Step 1: Secondary analysis of INSAG survey data

In order to build on earlier work the starting point was a secondary analysis of survey data collected from a number of nuclear facilities as a small part of research into safety culture commissioned by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG, 1991). This secondary analysis suggested a four factor model – see figure 1.



Fig. 1. Re-analysis of INSAG Safety Culture survey data (Smith and Garrett, 2004)

2.2 Step 2: Building on the knowledge base of safety managers

The second step was to further develop this model through discussion with BMA's Safety Managers. The two goals of this step were (a) to develop a series of questions that were meaningful to mine employees and (b) to consider the possibility of introducing additional factors to the measurement model. The results was a series of 60 questions that conceptually covered five safety factors: Leadership, Communication, Management, Change Readiness and Performance with Safety Leadership split across three sub-scales (i.e. supervisory support, goal clarity and work-life balance) and Safety Management also split across three sub-scales (i.e. procedures, disciplinary process and training) – see figure 2.



Fig 2. Conceptual Model for Safety Culture Survey developed with BMA's Safety Managers.

2.3 Step 3: Test of five factor safety model on a sample of 1071 mining employees

The third step was to test the factor structure empirically by presenting the questions as a self-report survey. This was done by adding the sixty questions in random order on to the end of two organisational culture surveys: the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) and the Organizational Effectiveness Inventory (OEI). This provided two data sets with a total of 1071 respondents

across several Queensland mine and other sites of a major Australian coal producer - see figure 3.

	lotal	BMA Satety Culture Respondents N=1071					
Data	Frequency	Percentage					
Organisational Role							
Executive member/Mine/PortManager	9	.9					
Manager	41	4.1					
Superintendent	34	3.4					
Supervisor	121	12.2					
Engineer	71	7.1					
OperatingMaintenance	470	47.3					
Other	197	19.8					
Prefer notio respond	51	5.1					
Age							
under 20	16	1.6					
20-29	162	16.1					
30-39	270	26.8					
40-49	299	29.7					
50-59	198	19.7					
60 or over	19	1.9					
prefer notio respond	43	4.3					
Gender							
Female	74	7.5					
Male	889	8.98					
prefer not to respond	29	2.9					
Years With Organisation							
less than 6 m on ths	78	7.7					
6 months to 1 year	103	10.2					
1 to 2 years	94	9.3					
2 to 4 years	121	11.9					
4 to 6 years	61	6.0					
6 to 10 years	91	9.0					
10 to 15 years	83	8.2					
more than 15 years	330	325					
Prefer notto respond	53	5.2					

Fig 3. Structure of Safety Culture Survey Sample

The results from this survey were subject to a series of analyses to (a) establish the factor structure using data from the 546 respondents who completed the safety culture questions along with the OCI and confirming this structure using data from the 525 respondents who completed the safety culture questions along with the OEI; and (b) to test the validity of both safety culture and the OCI as predictors of the safety performance

3.0 Results

3.1 Alpha reliabilities of the 9 scales used to measure safety culture

The alpha reliabilities of the 9 safety culture scales and some example question items are shown in Table1.

Factor 1: Safety Leadership (3 scales) **Supervisory Support** (6 items with an alpha reliability of 0.89) 037 My supervisor helps me find ways to achieve my safety objectives **Goal Clarity** (4 items with an alpha reliability of 0.77) I know and understand the company's safety goals Q19 **Work-Life Balance** (3 items with an alpha reliability of 0.73) Work allows me to balance my work and personal life Q48 Factor 2: Safety Management (3 scales) **Procedures** (6 items with an alpha reliability of 0.78) Our safety procedures are too strict 043 **Disciplinary Process** (4 items with an alpha reliability of 0.70) The company's safety disciplinary process on-site is fair & Q27 reasonable **Training** (5 items with an alpha reliability of 0.82) The company's safety training explains both the how and the why O 40 of safety rules Factor 3: Safety Communication (1 scale) Active Engagement (8 items with an alpha reliability of 0.86) Q6 It is simple to report breaches in safety practices Factor 4: Safety Change Readiness (1 scale) **Understanding Zero Harm** (5 items with an alpha reliability of 0.73) Zero harm gives me a chance to learn and use new skills Q35 Factor 5: Safety Performance (1 scale) **Safety System Rating** (7 items with an alpha reliability of 0.88) I would recommend my company as a safe place to work **O**10

Table 1. The Five Safety Culture Factors

3.2 Factor structure

The results show a clear five factor structure from the OCI sample that is confirmed using the OEI sample. The factor analysis results from both samples are illustrated for safety leadership in figure 4.

Safety Leadership Outcomes of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (First Sample)							
#	Standard Regression Weights	Error Variance	Squared multiple correlation R ²	Critical ratios	Composite reliability	Variance extracted	
	Supervisory Support				(B) 0.92	0.61	
Q37	0.726	.439	0.527	11.627	(A) 0.91	0.63	
Q45	0.765	.479	0.586	11.945			
Q56	0.834	.253	0.695	12.454			
Q60	0.841	.266	0.707	12.507			
Q46	0.777	.309	0.603	12.034			
Q54	0.772	.388	0.596	12.012			
Q47	0.525	.395	0.276	11.627			
	Goal Clarity				0.86	0.62	
Q19	0.805	.371	0.648	13.491			
Q20	0.778	.202	0.606	16.659			
Q22	0.719	.346	0.517	15.651			
Q23	0.620	.396	0.385	13.491			
Work Life Balance				0.76	0.54		
Q25	0.722	.513	0.521	8.653			
Q26	0.994	.015	0.989	8.953			
Q48	0.378	.840	0.143	8.653			

Deleted Item: Q47 I am clear about my safety responsibilities

Outcomes of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Second Sample)							
#	Standard Regression Weights	Error Variance	Squared multiple correlation R ²	Critical ratios	Composite reliability	Variance extracted	
Supervisory Support		•					
Q37	0.771	0.369	0.594	12.627	0.90	0.61	
Q45	0.811	0.430	0.658	13.945			
Q56	0.794	0.344	0.630	13.454			
Q60	0.852	0.250	0.725	14.507			
Q46	0.676	0.428	0.457	15.034			
Q54	0.751	0.467	0.565	11.012			
Goal Clarity				(B) 0.85	(B) 0.53		
Q19	0.772	0.187	0.596	13.491	(A) 0.83	(A) 0.56	
Q20	0.705	0.371	0.497	16.659			
Q47	0.496	0.350	0.246	11.757			
Q22	0.668	0.373	0.446	15.651			
Q23	0.509	0.499	0.270	13.491			
Work Life Balance				0.75	0.52		
Q25	0.668	0.581	0.446	8.653			
Q26	0.984	0.041	0.968	8.953			
Q48	0.448	0.864	0.201	8.653			

Safety Leadership Outcomes of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Second Sample)

Deleted Item: Q47 I am clear about my safety responsibilities

Fig. 4 Confirmatory factor analysis for Safety Leadership

3.3 Validity tests of the safety culture measure

The validity multiple regression test results are illustrated in figures 5 to 7.

They show that the safety factors are strong predictors of safety performance measured as a safety system rating (see figure 5).

-	94 1923 - 192 	Safety Culture Pred	lictiing Safety Pe	rformance (Safe	Safety System Rating)	
					Adjusted	Std. Error of	
_ <u>N</u>	Model	Loadorchia	R	R Square	R Square	the Estimate	
	Sately	Communication	.000-	.400	.400	.13309	
	Safety	Monogramment	./ 56°	.571	.570	.1 1936	
	Datety	Nanagement Okas as Daadia aas	.768°	.589	.588	.11687	
	Sarety	Unange Readiness	.770°	.594	.592	.11629	
	a	Predictors: (Constant), SafetyLe	eadership				
	b.	Predictors: (Constant), SafetyLe	adership, Safety	Com munication			
	C.	Predictors: (Constant), SafetyLe SafetyManagement	adership, Safety (Communication,			
d. Predictors: (Constant), Safety Communication, SafetyManagement, Safety Change Readiness							
Safety Le	eade	ership predicts 4	7% of the	e variance	in Safety	System Ratin	g.
Overall the	e fo	ur Safety Culture	variables	predict	59% of the	e variance in	Safet

Fig. 5 Safety culture factors predicting safety performance

System Rating (Safety Performance)

They also show that organizational culture measured, using the OCI, in terms of leadership styles also predicts safety performance measured as a safety system rating (see figure 6).

OCI								
Adjusted Std. Error of								
	Constructive	.467 ^a	.218	.217	.59112			
	Passive Devensive	.485 ^b	.235	.232	.58527			
 Predictors: (Constant), ConstructiveStyles, PassiveDevensiveStyles 								
Construe	ctive leadership	culture predi	icts 22% of t	he variance in a	Safety System Ra	ating.		
The OCI CONSTRUCTIVE styles reflect a healthy balance of people and task relationshi ps leading to the attainment of organisational goals through the de velopment of people. The OCI PASSIVE/DEFENSIVE styles (excluding avoidance) emphasise predictability and security at the cost of learning and adaptability.								
Together with Constructive styles, Passive/Defensive styles predict 23% of the variance inSafety System Rating (Safety Performance)								

Fig. 6 OCI as a predictor of safety performance

In particular, the regression results highlight the importance of communication – both safety and organizational (the latter measured using the OEI) – as a key predictor of safety performance measured as a safety system rating (see figure 7 and figure 8).





Fig. 7 Communication as a predictor of safety performance



Fig. 8 Communication questions used in the surveys.

3.4 The Safety Culture Measure as a diagnostic tool

The use of a standard measure of safety culture enables cross-site and cross group comparisons. Figure 9, for example, illustrates the relationship between organizational role and safety communication with greater active engagement correlated with more senior roles.



Fig 9 Safety communication and organizational role

4.0 Discussion and conclusion

Safety culture, when rigorously measured, shows that safety does not operate in a vacuum but rather that it lies within the wider organizational culture with, for example, the culture of leadership and communication impacting on employee's perception safety performance.

Validating safety culture measurement against employee's perceptions of safety performance is an important first step. In practical terms it is important that those who work within an organization can and do recommend it as a safe place to work. However, perception of performance is necessarily only one measure of performance. It is important that objective performance measures are also used to validate safety culture as a lead indicator. This validation is the next step of our research program that is exploring the relationships between safety culture and a number of safety and other organizational performance measures.

In conclusion, three practical advantages of understanding safety culture empirically within a rigorous psychometric paradigm are illustrated by this research. Firstly, that rigorous measurement provides a clear operational definition of safety culture – essential if results are to be meaningfully interpreted to inform safety management practice. Secondly, that rigorous measurement provides an opportunity to test the utility of self report survey measures as additional lead indicators and, thirdly, that it provides a potential for improving organisational performance through the use of a standardised benchmark measure.

5.0 References

Cooper M.D. (2000). *Towards a model of safety culture*. Safety Science, Vol 36, pp 111-136.

Cullen, W.D. (1990) *The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster*. HMSO, ISBN 0101 1102X.

Human Synergistics (2005) *Organizational Culture and Effectiveness Inventories* (*OCI/OEI*). <u>http://www.humansyn.com/site/index.php?doc174177739</u>

INSAG, International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (1991) *Safety culture*. International Atomic Energy Agency, Wien, Austria.

Smith, P.A. and Garrett, C. (2004) *An exploratory secondary analysis of the factor structure of the INSAG safety culture survey data.* Working paper presented for discussion, ANSTO, NSW.